Kolkata, 14 December (H.S.): The creation of integrated theatre commands has become an essential requirement for India’s preparedness for future wars, but the absence of a clear political decision continues to stall the process. Defence reforms of this scale cannot advance unless the political leadership lays down a firm direction, defines authority and fixes timelines to resolve inter-service differences. Theatreisation is no longer a technical reorganisation of the armed forces; it has emerged as a test of India’s political resolve to complete long-pending defence reforms.

At present, the Indian armed forces function largely under single-service command structures. The Army and the Air Force each operate seven commands, while the Navy has three. Only two fully integrated tri-service commands exist, the Andaman and Nicobar Command and the Strategic Forces Command, which oversees nuclear assets. This fragmented framework leads to parallel planning, duplication of logistics and inefficient use of resources during crises. In fast-paced modern warfare, such a structure increases the risk of delays, poor coordination and competing operational priorities.

The first major military operation after the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff and the Department of Military Affairs, Operation Sindoor, showed improved coordination among the services. However, it also highlighted the limitations of operating through separate command chains, where planning and execution can clash. Without integrated theatre commands, each service will continue to operate within its own domain, even as adversaries exploit gaps across land, sea, air, cyber and space.

Major global militaries have already moved far ahead in this direction. The United States implemented unified combatant commands through the Goldwater–Nichols Act in 1986, shifting operational control to integrated commanders while service chiefs focused on training and force development. China reorganised its military into five joint theatre commands in 2016, significantly enhancing its multi-domain capabilities along the Line of Actual Control and in maritime regions. For India, surrounded by two nuclear-armed neighbours, continuing with a service-centric command structure poses serious strategic risks.

India initiated defence reforms but has not carried them through to completion. The post of Chief of Defence Staff and the Department of Military Affairs were created in 2019–20, followed by steps such as joint postings, shared logistics and integrated training. In 2023, the Inter-Services Organisations Act granted disciplinary powers to joint commanders. Despite these measures, the core reform of converting 17 single-service commands into a limited number of theatre commands remains stalled. Initial plans for four theatre commands were revised after objections, leading to proposals for China- and Pakistan-focused theatres and a separate maritime command, but a final decision is still pending.

Inter-service differences remain the main obstacle. The Air Force has expressed concerns that geographically defined theatres could reduce the flexibility of its limited fighter fleet. The Army supports theatreisation but remains cautious about resource allocation, while the Navy has largely backed the reform. These debates are legitimate, but without decisive political intervention, a resolution remains unlikely.

The need for theatre commands is driven by the growing China–Pakistan military partnership, persistent pressure along India’s borders, and emerging threats from missiles, drones, cyber warfare and space-based systems. The objective of theatre commands is to ensure unity of command during war, optimise resources during peacetime and build genuinely integrated combat capability.

Ultimately, the question is not whether India needs theatre commands, but how long the country can afford the cost of delay. Just as the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff required political will, theatre commands now demand a clear political decision. Failing that, India risks confronting 21st-century threats with a 20th-century military structure, a strategic vulnerability that could prove costly in an increasingly hostile security environment.

Hindusthan Samachar / Satya Prakash Singh