India’s Mineral Auction Regime (2015–2026): Transparent Reform or Operational Bottleneck?
By Arun Bhaskar Deoras Introduction: The Promise of 2015 For decades prior to 2015, mining leases in India’s non-coal sector were allocated through administrative discretion—a system marked by opaque criteria that v
Arun Bhaskar Deoras


By Arun Bhaskar

Deoras

Introduction: The Promise of 2015

For decades prior to 2015, mining leases in India’s non-coal sector

were allocated through administrative discretion—a system marked by opaque

criteria that varied widely across states and officials. Recognizing the need for

transparency and revenue maximization, the Ministry of Mines introduced the

Mineral (Auction) Rules, 2015 under the Mines and Minerals (Development and

Regulation) Act, 1957.

On paper, the reform has been a resounding fiscal triumph. By 2026,

over 720+ major mineral blocks had been successfully auctioned

nationwide—culminating in a record-breaking FY 2025–26 where 212 blocks

(including 22 critical and strategic mineral blocks) were awarded. State mining

revenues surged roughly fivefold compared to the pre-auction decade.

Yet, beneath these headline numbers lies a sobering operational

reality: only around 101 to 105 auctioned blocks have actually commenced

production. With a national operationalization rate hovering near 14.5% to 15%,

industry veterans and policy observers are asking a difficult question: Is

India’s mineral auction regime a structural success, or is it stalled in a

regulatory debacle?

The Core Bottlenecks Behind Stalled

Mines

1. Sub-Optimal Lease Boundaries and Missing

Infrastructure Space:

Many blocks are carved out and put up for auction with footprints

too small to support modern, compliant mining operations. When a Notice

Inviting Tender (NIT) restricts a lease to the immediate ore body without

accounting for ancillary requirements, the project becomes physically

unworkable. Case Example — Imaliya Gold & Base Metal Deposit (Katni, Madhya

Pradesh): Auctioned with a lease area of just 6.51 hectares, the block contains

16 out-crops and 7 in-crops of mineral veins. However, open-cast mining

operations require nearly 50% of that space simply for storing overburden

(waste rock). This leaves virtually zero room for a beneficiation plant, gold

and silver extraction units, dry tailing storage, or basic vehicle maintenance

yards. Compounding the issue, adjacent zones containing six visible mineral

out-crops in the southern Safety Zone of the boundary.

2. Conflicting Land Records and Surprise

Forest Liabilities:

Perhaps the single biggest cause of post-auction paralysis is the

mismatch between land descriptions in tender documents and actual ground

records held by Revenue, Irrigation, and Forest departments. Bidders win blocks

assuming clear title, only to discover after securing Terms of Reference (ToR)

that the land is claimed under century-old forest notifications. Case Example —

Hivra Manganese Block: In the Hivra Manganese block, the NIT and 7/12 revenue

extracts indicated 0.00 hectares of forest land alongside 2.29 Ha of private

land and 4.61 Ha of government revenue land (totaling 6.90 Ha). However, upon

applying to the Forest Department, records revealed 6.65 Ha of forest land and

4.55 Ha of revenue land—suddenly saddling the lessee with an unexpected

11.20-hectare Compensatory Afforestation (CA) obligation that was listed as

Nil in the tender. In similar instances, lands recorded under a

Gram Panchayat or District Collector's jurisdiction—with valid No Objection

Certificates (NOCs) issued—are later halted when the Forest Department asserts

ownership based on 1912–1913 archival records.

3. Rigid Environmental Rules vs. Geological

Reality:

While ecological conservation is vital, industry practitioners point

out a fundamental asymmetry: forests can be regenerated and wildlife corridors

managed, whereas mineral deposits are fixed by geology and cannot be relocated.

Field Observation — Pench Tiger Sanctuary Southern Corridor (Maharashtra): Near

blocks such as Lanjera–Futala, wildlife corridors have been demarcated based on

isolated telemetry data tracking individual tiger movements rather than

established, large-scale herd or pack migration routes. Haphazardly drawn

buffer lines frequently sterilize rich mineral belts, turning environmental

clearances into multi-year deadlocks where forest creation overshadows mineral

development.

4. The Winner’s Curse and

Unviable Bid Math:

Under the auction framework, bidders quote

a Final Price Offer (FPO) as a percentage of the value of mineral dispatched,

tied to the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) Average Sale Price (ASP)—payable in

addition to statutory royalties, District Mineral Foundation (DMF), and

National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET) contributions. Intense competition

has driven bids to mathematically unsustainable heights. Case Example —

Bhilapar Manganese & Dolomite Block (Pandhurna, Madhya Pradesh): In a May

2025 Letter of Intent (LOI)

issued for a 9.037-hectare Composite Licence, the preferred bidder quoted an

astonishing Final Price Offer of 45,295.00%. When a lessee commits to paying

hundreds of times the base mineral value before accounting for extraction

costs, cash outflows dwarf legitimate revenues. Industry experts warn that such

hyper-aggressive bidding either leads to abandoned leases or creates perverse

financial pressure toward illegal mining.

Recent Policy Course Corrections (2026

Amendments)

Recognizing these ground-level frictions,

the Ministry of Mines introduced targeted reforms through the Mineral (Auction)

Amendment Rules in early 2026 (including the Second Amendment Rules notified on

March 30, 2026):

*Exclusion of Non-Feasible Areas: Preferred

bidders are now permitted to relinquish edge portions of a block (containing

less than 25% of estimated resources) if mining is blocked by forests, wildlife

corridors, rivers, or habitation.

*Automated Portals &

Refund Timelines: Introduction of an Online Unified Mining Portal for automated

LOI issuance upon receiving

performance security, alongside a 90-day timeline for refunding security

deposits when auctions are annulled for reasons not attributable to the bidder.

*Targeted Extensions:

Retaining the 2-year extension beyond the initial 3-year window strictly for

blocks involving forest clearances.

Roadmap for Reform: Bridging the Gap

Between Auction and Production

While the 2026 amendments address several procedural bottlenecks,

turning auctioned blocks into active mines requires deeper structural

alignment:

*Pre-Vetted, Unified Land

Records Before NIT: State governments must reconcile Revenue (7/12), Gram

Panchayat, Irrigation, and Forest records prior to floating a tender. Verified

land schedules and exact Compensatory Afforestation liabilities should be

legally binding parts of the NIT so bidders are not ambushed by 1912-era claims

post-award.

*Scientifically Sized Lease

Footprints: Geological agencies must design block boundaries that include

contiguous non-mineralized land sufficient for overburden dumps, beneficiation

plants, tailing dams, and administrative infrastructure.

*Rationalizing Bidding

Benchmarks: Instead of uncapped percentage multipliers on fluctuating ASPs,

bidding should be anchored to a realistic share of the lowest saleable grade’s

ASP as of the NIT date, spread predictably over the 50-year lease tenure—with

incremental payments triggered only when approved mining plan reviews confirm

higher gross resources.

*Data-Driven Corridor

Demarcation: Wildlife and forest authorities should review corridor boundaries

using multi-year, population-level ecological studies rather than single-animal

telemetry, balancing conservation with national mineral security.

Conclusion

India’s shift from discretionary allocation to competitive mineral

auctions successfully eliminated favoritism and unlocked substantial fiscal

value for mineral-rich states. However, an auction is only a means to an

end—not the end itself. Until land records are harmonized, lease boundaries are

designed for real-world engineering, and bidding economics are grounded in

commercial viability, the gap between blocks auctioned and mines

operationalized will remain India’s biggest mining challenge.

(The writer is an accomplished mining professional and general management executive with over five decades of expertise spanning underground and open-pit mining operations, multinational industrial project execution, and global market development. Holding a First Class Mine Manager's Certificate and an A.I.S.M. in Mining from the Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad, he has held senior leadership roles with prominent organizations such as Hindustan Copper Ltd., Atlas Copco, Consolidated Pneumatic Tool Co., and Tara Ultimo, while also contributing extensively as an independent technical consultant and mining plan designer.)

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Hindusthan Samachar / Sachin Budhauliya


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