
By Arun Bhaskar
Deoras
Introduction: The Promise of 2015
For decades prior to 2015, mining leases in India’s non-coal sector
were allocated through administrative discretion—a system marked by opaque
criteria that varied widely across states and officials. Recognizing the need for
transparency and revenue maximization, the Ministry of Mines introduced the
Mineral (Auction) Rules, 2015 under the Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1957.
On paper, the reform has been a resounding fiscal triumph. By 2026,
over 720+ major mineral blocks had been successfully auctioned
nationwide—culminating in a record-breaking FY 2025–26 where 212 blocks
(including 22 critical and strategic mineral blocks) were awarded. State mining
revenues surged roughly fivefold compared to the pre-auction decade.
Yet, beneath these headline numbers lies a sobering operational
reality: only around 101 to 105 auctioned blocks have actually commenced
production. With a national operationalization rate hovering near 14.5% to 15%,
industry veterans and policy observers are asking a difficult question: Is
India’s mineral auction regime a structural success, or is it stalled in a
regulatory debacle?
The Core Bottlenecks Behind Stalled
Mines
1. Sub-Optimal Lease Boundaries and Missing
Infrastructure Space:
Many blocks are carved out and put up for auction with footprints
too small to support modern, compliant mining operations. When a Notice
Inviting Tender (NIT) restricts a lease to the immediate ore body without
accounting for ancillary requirements, the project becomes physically
unworkable. Case Example — Imaliya Gold & Base Metal Deposit (Katni, Madhya
Pradesh): Auctioned with a lease area of just 6.51 hectares, the block contains
16 out-crops and 7 in-crops of mineral veins. However, open-cast mining
operations require nearly 50% of that space simply for storing overburden
(waste rock). This leaves virtually zero room for a beneficiation plant, gold
and silver extraction units, dry tailing storage, or basic vehicle maintenance
yards. Compounding the issue, adjacent zones containing six visible mineral
out-crops in the southern Safety Zone of the boundary.
2. Conflicting Land Records and Surprise
Forest Liabilities:
Perhaps the single biggest cause of post-auction paralysis is the
mismatch between land descriptions in tender documents and actual ground
records held by Revenue, Irrigation, and Forest departments. Bidders win blocks
assuming clear title, only to discover after securing Terms of Reference (ToR)
that the land is claimed under century-old forest notifications. Case Example —
Hivra Manganese Block: In the Hivra Manganese block, the NIT and 7/12 revenue
extracts indicated 0.00 hectares of forest land alongside 2.29 Ha of private
land and 4.61 Ha of government revenue land (totaling 6.90 Ha). However, upon
applying to the Forest Department, records revealed 6.65 Ha of forest land and
4.55 Ha of revenue land—suddenly saddling the lessee with an unexpected
11.20-hectare Compensatory Afforestation (CA) obligation that was listed as
Nil in the tender. In similar instances, lands recorded under a
Gram Panchayat or District Collector's jurisdiction—with valid No Objection
Certificates (NOCs) issued—are later halted when the Forest Department asserts
ownership based on 1912–1913 archival records.
3. Rigid Environmental Rules vs. Geological
Reality:
While ecological conservation is vital, industry practitioners point
out a fundamental asymmetry: forests can be regenerated and wildlife corridors
managed, whereas mineral deposits are fixed by geology and cannot be relocated.
Field Observation — Pench Tiger Sanctuary Southern Corridor (Maharashtra): Near
blocks such as Lanjera–Futala, wildlife corridors have been demarcated based on
isolated telemetry data tracking individual tiger movements rather than
established, large-scale herd or pack migration routes. Haphazardly drawn
buffer lines frequently sterilize rich mineral belts, turning environmental
clearances into multi-year deadlocks where forest creation overshadows mineral
development.
4. The Winner’s Curse and
Unviable Bid Math:
Under the auction framework, bidders quote
a Final Price Offer (FPO) as a percentage of the value of mineral dispatched,
tied to the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) Average Sale Price (ASP)—payable in
addition to statutory royalties, District Mineral Foundation (DMF), and
National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET) contributions. Intense competition
has driven bids to mathematically unsustainable heights. Case Example —
Bhilapar Manganese & Dolomite Block (Pandhurna, Madhya Pradesh): In a May
2025 Letter of Intent (LOI)
issued for a 9.037-hectare Composite Licence, the preferred bidder quoted an
astonishing Final Price Offer of 45,295.00%. When a lessee commits to paying
hundreds of times the base mineral value before accounting for extraction
costs, cash outflows dwarf legitimate revenues. Industry experts warn that such
hyper-aggressive bidding either leads to abandoned leases or creates perverse
financial pressure toward illegal mining.
Recent Policy Course Corrections (2026
Amendments)
Recognizing these ground-level frictions,
the Ministry of Mines introduced targeted reforms through the Mineral (Auction)
Amendment Rules in early 2026 (including the Second Amendment Rules notified on
March 30, 2026):
*Exclusion of Non-Feasible Areas: Preferred
bidders are now permitted to relinquish edge portions of a block (containing
less than 25% of estimated resources) if mining is blocked by forests, wildlife
corridors, rivers, or habitation.
*Automated Portals &
Refund Timelines: Introduction of an Online Unified Mining Portal for automated
LOI issuance upon receiving
performance security, alongside a 90-day timeline for refunding security
deposits when auctions are annulled for reasons not attributable to the bidder.
*Targeted Extensions:
Retaining the 2-year extension beyond the initial 3-year window strictly for
blocks involving forest clearances.
Roadmap for Reform: Bridging the Gap
Between Auction and Production
While the 2026 amendments address several procedural bottlenecks,
turning auctioned blocks into active mines requires deeper structural
alignment:
*Pre-Vetted, Unified Land
Records Before NIT: State governments must reconcile Revenue (7/12), Gram
Panchayat, Irrigation, and Forest records prior to floating a tender. Verified
land schedules and exact Compensatory Afforestation liabilities should be
legally binding parts of the NIT so bidders are not ambushed by 1912-era claims
post-award.
*Scientifically Sized Lease
Footprints: Geological agencies must design block boundaries that include
contiguous non-mineralized land sufficient for overburden dumps, beneficiation
plants, tailing dams, and administrative infrastructure.
*Rationalizing Bidding
Benchmarks: Instead of uncapped percentage multipliers on fluctuating ASPs,
bidding should be anchored to a realistic share of the lowest saleable grade’s
ASP as of the NIT date, spread predictably over the 50-year lease tenure—with
incremental payments triggered only when approved mining plan reviews confirm
higher gross resources.
*Data-Driven Corridor
Demarcation: Wildlife and forest authorities should review corridor boundaries
using multi-year, population-level ecological studies rather than single-animal
telemetry, balancing conservation with national mineral security.
Conclusion
India’s shift from discretionary allocation to competitive mineral
auctions successfully eliminated favoritism and unlocked substantial fiscal
value for mineral-rich states. However, an auction is only a means to an
end—not the end itself. Until land records are harmonized, lease boundaries are
designed for real-world engineering, and bidding economics are grounded in
commercial viability, the gap between blocks auctioned and mines
operationalized will remain India’s biggest mining challenge.
(The writer is an accomplished mining professional and general management executive with over five decades of expertise spanning underground and open-pit mining operations, multinational industrial project execution, and global market development. Holding a First Class Mine Manager's Certificate and an A.I.S.M. in Mining from the Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad, he has held senior leadership roles with prominent organizations such as Hindustan Copper Ltd., Atlas Copco, Consolidated Pneumatic Tool Co., and Tara Ultimo, while also contributing extensively as an independent technical consultant and mining plan designer.)
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Hindusthan Samachar / Sachin Budhauliya